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The nuclear industry in Europe is generally viewed as mature, successful, sustainable and responsible. 
Its development was influenced and accompanied by the implementation of the Euratom Treaty that 
provided early on a legal and regional framework. Through an analysis of the main chapters of the 
Euratom Treaty and its own development, this paper highlights some provisions that have had and still 
have a practical effect on the European nuclear industry. In doing so, the author hopes to highlight 
some of the advantages and shortcomings that might accompany the creation of new regional 
regulatory agencies dealing with nuclear industries in other parts of the world. Even though it would 
not be wise nor efficient to try and replicate the model nowadays, the Euratom approach can be 
inspiring to other regions and some of its tools could be very relevant to support the development of 
nuclear energy, and create a sense of community on a regional basis for instance in the Middle East. 
Keywords 
Euratom, nuclear industry, safeguards, Middle East. 
  
Introduction 
The founders of the European Union had a clear vision of the special role that nuclear energy could or 
should play in the future: they shared the belief that nuclear energy should participate in the making of 
a global European Community, and to crystalize this vision, they wrote and signed the Euratom Treaty 
(1957) which was one of the three Treaties that founded the European Union. Unlike the Treaty 
instituting the Community of Coal and Steel, the other energy dedicated Treaty, Euratom was 
conceived as an open ended Treaty without any termination date, and it has not been significantly 
modified since 1957 (except for the fusion of the institutions -European Parliament, Council, 
Commission and ECOSOC- that occurred in1967). Moreover, the provisions were sometimes very 
precise and set up a number of rules and “requirements “ that mostly Member States but also “persons 
or undertakings” were to comply with. Today, the Euratom Treaty only represents the basis for a broad 
and complex set of “secondary law” that has developed overtime, allowing an adaptation and 
evolution of the constraints and practices. 
Still, the relationship with Member States and industry has continuously evolved, with the growth 
of the use of nuclear energy in Europe, with the successive enlargements of the EU and also in 
reaction to nuclear accidents. It is regrettable that almost no research documents this evolution, as the 
assessment of the Euratom Treaty is widely contrasted, depending on who is speaking. For instance, in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, the Chernobyl accident gave rise to strong anti nuclear feelings and 
movements, and the Euratom Treaty was criticized for its lack of democracy given the relatively light 
impact of the European Parliament in the decision making process, and it was also attacked as being 
too supportive of nuclear energy and too favourable to the industry. However, at the exact same time, 
the perception of the nuclear industry was that this Treaty was not a support of their activity but rather, 
that it might be used to impose more constraints and delays, might serve the ideas of anti nuclear 
minorities and at best represented another source of useless administrative burden.  
To fill this gap, this seeks to analyse the main chapters of the Treaty from the industry’s point of 
view. In doing so, this paper hopes to highlight some of the advantages and shortcomings that might 
accompany the creation of new regional regulatory agencies dealing with nuclear industries in other 
parts of the world. Of course, the problems and opportunities associated with the evolution of Euratom 
were dependent on the historical evolution in Europe, but some of the legal provisions in the treaty 
itself should be studied for the effect they had on the development of the industry. This paper surveys 
successively the main advantages that the treaty brought to the development of a sustainable and 
ecologically responsible industry in Europe.  
I. The Euratom Treaty‘s constraints are real but benefit the industry  
These constraints are mainly directed to the Member States and may result in indirect additional 
burden for the private sector while some provisions directly affect the “persons undertakings”. 
1. Radiation protection (Chapter 3) 
Chapter 3 covers the health protection and, more broadly, the protection of the environment. Member 
States have to ensure a permanent surveillance of the radiation level of the air, waters and soils under 
their jurisdiction and must establish appropriate monitoring equipment. Although Art 35 provides for 
the verification of such equipment, (belonging to the Sate Authorities) in practice this “right of 
control” is also exercised on the operators’ equipment and devices, and an access to the operators’ 
measurements and records is nowadays usually asked by the Commission. Of course, these records 
may provide commercially sensitive information like indications on the actual production programme. 
But this practice can be beneficial to the operators whose equipment and records are recognized to be 
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excellent. In some instances, the operators may refer to a satisfactory visit of the Commission services 
to advocate the quality of their controls and the absence of illegal releases. 
Another constraint according to article 37, relates to the need for Member State to provide the 
Commission the general data relating to any project of “release of radioactive effluents” so that the 
Commission may give its advice within 6 months. Some industry representatives may contend that this 
provision may impose an additional delay and additional specific paperwork (in addition to the 
paperwork asked by the national regulator, in case similar requirements exist at the national level) to 
the operator who wishes to file an authorization to start a new facility or an extension of a facility or a 
modification of a process that may involve additional releases. Indeed, although the advice of the 
Commission should only concern the likelihood of such project adversely affecting another Member 
State territory, and although the responsibility of providing and explaining the project and information 
rests with the State’s Authority, the operator is to prepare the paperwork and may be asked, eventually 
to modify its project. However, here again, the operators may be willing to have a positive advice of 
the Commission on their project to argue against possible negative opinions, in particular from 
neighbouring countries.  
These provisions may be of particular interest to other regions which wish to institutionalize 
regulatory frameworks as they are the least controversial from the industry’s point of view, the most 
helpful to ensure the growth of a sustainable and ecologically responsible industry, and the most useful 
to ensure the safety of the citizens of the region. 
2. Safeguards 
Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty complemented with specific regulation provides for a Euratom 
safeguards system on ore, material and fissile material that is very similar to the IAEA safeguards 
system in its implementation. A specific Euratom inspectorate is in charge of the verification on the 
declared material and facilities.  
A few specificities must however be outlined: 
- The Euratom safeguards aims at verifying the conformity of the effective use of such materials 
with the declared uses, it is not as such a verification of non-proliferation. (Finality/conformity 
controls). From this point of view, the Euratom safeguards directly impose obligations on the 
operators even though it also provides for some role for the Member State. 
- The Euratom safeguards also aim at verifying that the specific obligations accepted through a 
supply agreement are being complied with. This involves a follow up by the Euratom Safeguards 
of so called “flags” on the materials and a sometimes very cumbersome, time and resource 
consuming management of flag swaps in order to facilitate or even be compatible with the 
industrial processes and commercial contracts. This is a very specific task that the IAEA does not 
undertake. 
- The Euratom safeguards system cover all peaceful activities within the Community that is also all 
peaceful material in the Nuclear Weapon States.  
- Sanctions may be decided against the operators (persons or undertakings). These sanctions range 
from a simple warning, to the withdrawal of nuclear material, and include the possibility of a 
“tutorship” of the operator (“placing of the undertaking for a period not exceeding four months 
under the administration of a person or board appointed by common accord of the Commission 
and the State having jurisdiction over the undertaking »)  
As described above, the safeguards provisions of the Euratom Treaty involve a number of specific 
obligations, including to facilities that are located in the NWS. In the Member States where a national 
control and accountancy system exist, it results in an additional burden even though Euratom 
inspections are often carried out as joint teams with the IAEA inspections. In the Member States 
where there is no NMCA, Euratom safeguards play the role of the NMCA and it can be argued that 
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there is no additional burden to the operator. The sanction mechanism is certainly a specific tool that 
may negatively affect the image of the facility/industry concerned but it should be stressed is has very 
seldom been applied (less than in ten occasions), and it can be of interest to other regions that may 
establish regional regulatory authorities for the purpose of ensuring the peaceful character of their 
nuclear growth. 
Again, although some significant resources are needed from the operator to prepare and accompany 
the inspectorate, to carry out paperwork involving sometimes time-consuming exchanges to inform, or 
explain some discrepancies to the Euratom Safeguards Office, some benefits may found to it. Indeed 
the existence of regular Euratom inspections and the verification of the accountancy may act as a 
quality control check and play an incentive role to the operator. 
3. Investments (chapter 4) 
Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty complemented with other regulatory and advisory texts, requires that 
persons and undertakings planning to build new facilities or replace and transform older facilities, 
provide a rather detailed information about their project at least 3 months before signing the first 
contracts. In addition they should be ready to discuss all aspects of the projects at the request of the 
Commission. On this basis, the Commission may publish its position on the project provided the 
undertaking and its Member State agree.  
This process is certainly an additional burden to the industry and may be seen as an unnecessary 
and preliminary exposure to public opposition from other countries. But here again, a positive opinion 
by the Commission on a specific investment can be useful to get financial or political support to their 
project.  
4. Supply (chapter 6) 
In the context of a nascent industry and taking into account the scarcity of resources especially in 
fissile material, the fathers of the Treaty created a regime of Community ownership (Chap 8) on which 
the provisions relating to the supply of material were based. This explains why the most complex 
chapter of the treaty (chapter 6) is devoted to the supply of nuclear material and the establishment of a 
system based on the principle of equal access to resources, and supporting a common supply policy.  
The system placed under the responsibility of the EURATOM Supply Agency (ESA) acting as a 
central agent gathering the needs of users and offers of producers and allocating scarce supplies, has 
been periodically criticized and the interpretation of specific provisions has been challenged and 
brought to the Court of Justice (namely the definition of enrichment as a service or as a production). 
Without entering into a detailed description of the legal complexity of the system, and at the risk of 
oversimplification, it is sufficient to underline a few characteristics that seem particularly burdensome 
to the operators. 
- The ESA’s right of option on materials produced in the Community as well as the exclusive right 
to conclude supply contracts even if applied in a flexible way (concurrence of signature, simple 
communication of major elements of the contract but without prices) is viewed as a burden and an 
additional risk that commercial information would be unveiled to competitors. If applied literally, 
the negotiation by the supply Agency of supply contracts would not allow the EU companies to 
freely negotiate with their foreign counterparts in the same fair and flexible manner as their non-
EU competitors. 
- The requirement to notify all “processing” contracts creates an administrative burden that non-EU 
countries do not have to bear. 
- The possibility of the ESA opposing a contract in the benefit of its supply policy is certainly seen 
as an unfair lack of predictability and as a burden to the company directly involved. 
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However, this is to be seen as a protection of the market conditions and in the long- term interest of 
the member States. Besides, fortunately the implementation of this chapter 6 has evolved and has been 
clarified over time (even at the price of legal confrontations). Although from the point of view of the 
industry, the administrative workload involved by these rules are still seen as a burden, there is a better 
acceptance of the compromise reached about their implementation and their overall justification.  
II. EURATOM as a support to the industry; to what extent? 
Different provisions may be seen as having supported the development of the nuclear industry in the 
EU. However today the effective and direct support may be questioned. 
1. R&D (Chapter 1) 
It is obvious from the title 2 of the Euratom Treaty, “provisions for the encouragement of progress in 
the field of nuclear energy nuclear” which really represents the core of the Treaty, and in particular 
from Chapter one dedicated to the promotion of science, that the intent of the founding fathers was to 
promote nuclear development and industry in Europe. This policy was developed through a 
coordinated approach to R&D with the financial support of its member-states, the establishment of 
Euratom Framework programmes, and very creatively through the establishment of the Nuclear Joint 
Research Centre, with dedicated specialized centres and facilities. This certainly contributed to a 
global European approach to nuclear R&D and to the development of a European research 
community. 
The Euratom Framework Programme has served as a model for the other fields of the EU research 
and overtime the Euratom budget has relatively decreased while the EU research budget has constantly 
increased. (The Euratom budget represented 11% of the total R&D budget for FP 4 and only roughly 
represents 7,5 % of FP7) 
In addition, the largest portion of the budget is dedicated to fusion and the fission part (which 
amounts to less than 15% of the Fusion budget), which mainly finances waste management and 
radiation protection while no direct support goes to nuclear energy developments like new generation 
reactors.  
In parallel, the JRC, which was once only dedicated to nuclear research, is increasingly a tool for 
the other fields of the EU research. 
Therefore although there is still some activity under the Euratom budget, it can hardly be argued 
that it directly benefits the industry.  
2. Joint Enterprises (Chapter 5)  
The concept of Joint Enterprise was, like the JRC a rather innovative idea that was to facilitate the 
establishment of a European, multinational based industry that was deemed important for the 
development of nuclear energy. 
Apart of some financial support, there was some tax advantages like tax exemptions attached to it.  
However it should be noted that only a very small number of Joint enterprises have been 
constituted (they entail a complex process of approval by the EU Council). Among the main Joint 
enterprises, the German based HTR gmbh (High temperature reactor) in 1974, the Jet in UK (Joint 
European Torus in) in 1978 and the last one, ITER, in France (fusion) in 2007. It is worth noting that 
the large industries like Urenco and Eurodif have developed as multinationals but have not applied to 
be granted the Joint Enterprise status. Thus, even though the status of joint enterprise exists, it has not 
been used to incorporate critical facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, and therefore, Euratom’s history 
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does not present a rich precedent for other regions which might want to draw lessons for the 
multilateralization of their nuclear fuel cycle.  
3. Euratom Loans  
The Euratom loans are based on article 172.4 of the Euratom Treaty and were implemented through 
Council decisions. The first decision was adopted in 1977 and helped finance a number of projects 
within the Euratom countries, ranging from NPP to enrichment plant and also the UK reprocessing 
facility, for a total of 2,876 billion euros. After 1987 no Euratom loans was granted to a Member State 
and it must be noted that all past loans granted to EU member States have been fully repaid.  
After the Chernobyl accident it was decided in 1994 to open the possibility of Euratom loans to 
finance mainly safety or dismantlement related projects in the neighbouring Eastern Europe countries.  
Nowadays, although there is still 626 million euros available in principle, (the total Euratom loan 
envelope was capped at 4 billion euros) the possibility of Euratom loans being granted for a new NPP 
for instance in Poland seems highly unlikely, mainly for political reasons. 
While it could be argued that the Euratom Treaty has directly benefited the industry, this is no more 
the case given the lack of resources and of political consensus to use it. 
4. Cooperation agreements 
Cooperation agreements are now often needed to access to an import of technology, equipment or 
material. If the main nuclear countries usually do have such agreements or are ready to negotiate new 
ones if needed EU countries with limited or inexistent nuclear projects may not be prepared to do so, 
or may not be as successful in the negotiation process and their industry may be negatively impacted.  
The benefit of umbrella agreements negotiated in the name and implemented through or with the 
support of the 27 Member States of the EU is certainly something that may be a support for nuclear 
industry in smaller or even non-nuclear countries of the EU. 
Conclusion 
One could have long-lasting discussions about the responsibility and success of the Euratom Treaty in 
today’s situation in the EU regarding nuclear energy and nuclear industry.  
Many provisions may seem obsolete and not effective in Europe. Some provisions could 
potentially be revived but would involve too much of a political consensus and healthy overall 
economic situation. They could also inspire other parts of the world who wish to set up a regional 
regulatory agency, as their relevance might be higher there than in Europe (for instance, sanctions 
against violations of safeguards agreements, or the multi-lateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle 
through the status of ‘joint enterprise’). But before one talks about exporting the Euratom Treaty 
approach to other regions, one should not just stick to the analysis of the letter or of the spirit of the 
Treaty but should have a broader assessment of the reality of its implementation. With this in mind, 
the constraints brought by the Treaty namely in the field of safeguards and supply, but also in the field 
of radiation protection, which some industry representatives may have seen as disproportionate, can 
also have served a positive role for the European nuclear industry in that they have contributed to 
build a real community: they levelled the playing field in safeguards and accountancy, radiation 
protection norms and even safety assurances. In doing so, they have contributed to comforting a 
reliable image of the European nuclear actors and allowed the EU countries to support IAEA 
initiatives and role in these fields. In turn, what is usually criticized by nuclear opponents as covert 
“subsidies” has been reduced over the years and do not represent today a real support.  
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This being said, the Euratom Treaty may still generate new initiatives in favour of a global 
approach to nuclear development within the EU through a dedicated very long- term financial 
mechanism taking into account the need for large investments with a longer term of return on 
investments.  
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